There have been a number of articles and proof-of-concept hacks in recent years illustrating vulnerabilities in IP camera software, access control systems, and the like. Some have raised awareness about fundamental flaws in technology – like the relative insecurity of common proximity card readers, unprotected programming access to a locking system, and simple methods to access a camera’s video feed. Most of the attention following these announcements is focused on the ability of a device to be bypassed or viewed (in the case of a camera), which misses a critical point. While it is concerning that a replay attack can spoof an access card, and that an IP camera may not provide adequate security against unauthorized viewing, the real danger lies in the potential of these systems to be hacked and modified to serve some other purpose. Here are a few examples – and a prediction: We will see one or more of these in the wild within 24 months.
Scenario One: The IP Camera Worm Many IP cameras are designed using, not microprocessors, so their ability to run arbitrary code is limited. This trend is changing, however, and as cameras adopt a more standards-based architecture, they will become powerful edge devices running operating systems that can be attacked like any other. Some higher-end models can already run cron scripts, handle video analytics, and manage local storage of data. They are, without exaggeration, computers with a lens and network connection. They are also commonly thought of as “,” with a plug-and-play approach applied to many projects. It is feasible that a worm or other malware could infect these devices as early as the point of manufacturing, or when they are plugged into the installer’s laptop for programming.
The software might lie dormant or attempt to infect other cameras or computers on the same network. Affected devices could even be used to launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the recording server or some other target. The common practice – at least in larger systems – of segmenting cameras onto their own LAN might help to reduce this potential, but since the recording server is usually connected to other network(s) for remote viewing and administration, malware capable of infecting the server is a logical progression of this threat. Scenario Two: The surveillance DVR/ (Network Video Recorder) as a point of entry into corporate networks Executives like video surveillance systems – and for good reason. As networks and video quality have improved, these systems have saved organizations tremendous amounts of money. Investigations can be performed more efficiently, guards can be reduced, travel costs can be cut, and the list goes on.
This means, of course, that the video systems need to be accessible to various departments via the corporate network. Most implement some type of basic security, like requiring a remote user to connect over a VPN, but few have taken steps to totally isolate the video traffic from other network systems.
Since many DVRs and NVRs are full-fledged PCs running Windows or Linux, they are vulnerable to the same kinds of attacks as any other server or workstation, but they are easily overlooked and could become a “zero-day” vulnerability or convenient back door into the network. Scenario Three: Unintended “Integration” Every year, security hardware and software moves closer to delivering on the promise of interoperability. It has been a long road, and there are still miles to go, but today’s systems come equipped with protocols for a variety of devices, in order to enable integration.
This means that building a “security network” within an enterprise often makes sense. To gain the full benefit from your systems, they need to be able to interact, and since capabilities are sure to be added later – anything that might need to share data ends up on the same. When industrial controllers, manufacturing equipment, or other critical systems make this list, the scene is set for security devices to be used as a launchpad for espionage or manipulation. It can seem logical to group these systems together – after all, the “security network” should be a safe place for any important devices, right? So, why is a hack inevitable?
![Dvr Password Hack Dvr Password Hack](/uploads/1/2/4/2/124297742/193661913.jpg)
Fundamental to the problem is that these systems and devices are routinely installed without sufficient thought given to security, and without a plan for ongoing monitoring and maintenance. Furthermore, some of the latest features of alarm panels, home automation controllers, IP cameras and DVRs require Internet access or remote server connections just to function properly, opening a vector of attack that, again, is not well understood or monitored. This means that segmenting a network or “” the application may not be an option unless the owner is willing to sacrifice functionality.
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I realize that it is not much of a stretch to predict that a hackable device connected to a network might be used in a new and nefarious way but let’s hope I’m just plain wrong. For More: – Article discussing vulnerabilities in consumer DVRs (example) site, dedicated to hacking various cameras and the development of custom firmware.
Hikvision devices with default passwords and remote network access enabled (via DDNS, public IPs, etc.) have experienced wide spread hacking over the past month locking out users, IPVM has confirmed. This is new, and from what has been reported by those affected, appears to be different than Mirai. During the Mirai botnet attacks in 2016, there were no reports of Hikvision devices being hacked. UPDATE: 4 hours after IPVM's report was released, Hikvision sent an email to its dealers admitting this. Reported Infections US, UK and New Zealand integrators have all reported cases of Hikvision recorders being attacked, at least hundreds of devices in the past month from just these reports: Today lots of Hikvision customers dvr/nvrs, used till now with default password (12345), seem to have changed password by themselves. We are HiKVision OEM partner. These DVRs will have been hacked.
Over the last week we have had over 150 customer DVRs that have been hacked and the password changed. I just experienced my first one this week. Symptom was DVR not accessible via browser or app, password didn't work. I had to go on site and run the password reset. Was an older firmware and it let me. When I got back in I found this: I never created a 'system' account.
I have had a couple Interlogix cameras (same thing as Hikvision renamed) do the same thing and we had to go out and physically factory default the camera. The weird think about it is that they are attached to an Avigilon VMS and not open to the Internet. Something very odd going on here and I can't figure it out. We've had four customers in the last couple of weeks locked out of their Hikvision recorders by what looks like bot. All clients were on old firmware with default admin password of 12345 and default ports -I know, I know, they were all installs from years ago who we hadn't visited since. In all cases the admin password has changed and a new SYSTEM user has been added. Our Hikvision distributor has been inundated with pw reset code requests.
Keep Me Posted! Most of our calls (20-30) were HIK OEM’s (KT&C rebrands TVL series) HD-TVI recorders. In every case reported so far, the recorders were using the default admin password '12345', and had remote access to the web interface on port 8000. Firmware versions affected are unknown, but are likely older versions before Hikvision forced users to set their own admin password.
The attack changes the default admin password, and adds a new account, 'system' to the device. So far there is no evidence the recorders have been used in any kind of botnet attack. Stopping / Handling This Botnets move fast across the Internet - iterating over the finite number of public IP addresses is straightforward, and tools like plus make it easy to find devices that may be susceptible to a known exploit.
Chances are, if your Hikvision recorder has an admin password of '12345', or an easily guessed password, and is accessible via the public Internet, it has already been hacked. If your recorder has a 'system' account in the user list that was not added on purpose, it has been affected: If you have been hacked, you will need to restore the admin password to gain access to the device. One integrator reported success using Hikvision's password reset function, others have done a physical restore/reset on the device. If you have not been hacked, ensure the admin password is set to something uncommon and not easily guessed. Additionally, ensure firmware is kept up to date, check for latest versions. Attack Details Because affected devices have not had ports like telnet or SSH open, or were running firmware builds known to have these services disabled, the most likely scenario is that the attack utilizes the web UI to create the new account and alter the admin password. The attack can most likely try passwords other than '12345', similar to how Mirai has a list of common username/password combinations it tries on each device it attacks.
This attack also has the potential to infect many more devices than Mirai did, as it only requires remote access to the standard user interface, and does not require telnet or SSH access. Where Mirai relied on devices with no firewall, or poorly configured firewalls, this attack can target devices that are behind a firewall, as long as they have basic remote access enabled. Purpose/Extent Of Exploit Unknown What the attack does that may not be visible, such as upload scripts or files intended to be called later, after enough devices are infected to create a strong botnet army, is not yet known. Because of this, the best course of action would be to completely reset the device, upgrade to latest firmware, and set a strong admin password before putting it back online. Responsibility While Hikvision is responsible for making such equipment, the integrators and users involved are responsible, both for not having upgraded their equipment in 2 years or more since these risks were made clear by Hikvision, and by incidents like the Mirai botnet that relied on poorly secured devices. Market Impact While Hikvision can rightfully point to its efforts to improve in the past 2 years, they will still suffer from the various integrators and end users who are impacted by this botnet hacking, and having to spend time resetting or restoring affected units.
UPDATE: Hikvision Admits Hikvision has obviously known about this for weeks. If IPVM is getting a half dozen reports, that means Hikvision must have gotten 500 or 5,000 reports. However, instead of doing the right thing and letting people know immediately about this, they choose to hide it until IPVM's report forced them to acknowledge it.
By delaying, they have put more users at risk. 4 hours after IPVM's report was released, Hikvision (USA) sent an email to its dealers admitting this:.
Further ReadingJohannes B. Ullrich, a researcher and chief technology officer for the SANS Internet Storm Center, wanted to know just how vulnerable these devices are to remote takeover, so he connected an older DVR to a cable modem Internet connection. What he saw next—a barrage of so dizzying it crashed his device—was depressing. 'The sad part is, that I didn't have to wait long,' he wrote in a. 'The IP address is hit by telnet attempts pretty much every minute. Instead of having to wait for a long time to see an attack, my problem was that the DVR was often overwhelmed by the attacks, and the telnet server stopped responding. I had to reboot it every few minutes.'
A large number of the connection attempts didn't succeed, because the passwords used in the attempted compromise didn't match the default passcode used by his device. Still, 'a couple times an hour, someone used the correct password.' Fortunately, Ullrich had cordoned off his device to prevent it from harming other Internet citizens. In the background, however, his honeypot showed his device was receiving commands from the hacker mother ship instructing it to scan the Internet for similarly vulnerable devices. Further ReadingThe malware that commandeered Ullrich's device is known as Mirai, and it's one of at least two such applications that's unleashing DDoSes of previously unimaginable sizes on targets.
Dvr Password Check
Just a year ago, attacks of 620 gigabits per second were only within the reach of nation-sponsored hackers or the most formidable criminal enterprises. Thanks to Mirai and its older counterpart known as Bashlight, they're becoming a point-and-click exercise that relatively unskilled script kiddies can do. As reported Sunday, all but assuring its use will go mainstream.
63 passwords is all it takes To build its massive arsenal, according to, Mirai peppers targeted IoT devices with just 63 different password guesses. Unfortunately, so many devices use one of them as the default login password that Mirai has now become the digital equivalent of a cannon that can knock even large websites offline unless they pay large sums of money to have the attacks blocked. One of the passwords that Ullrich observed being used against the IoT honeypots he monitors is '7ujMko0admin.' That just happens to be the, one of the most common foot soldiers conscripted into this new breed of DDoS armies.
Ullrich has also observed a surge in scans that use the password 'xc3511,' which is used by default in a generic line of DVRs.